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The mfecane as fetish
In the last six years a major controversy has blown up among
historians of southern Africa about the historical reality or
otherwise of the phenomenon commonly known as the mfecane.1
Since it was first popularized by John Omer-Cooper in his book
The Zulu Aftermath, published in 1966,2 the term has become
widely used as a designation for the wars and migrations which
took place among African communities across much of the east-
ern half of southern Africa in the 1820s and 1830s. For more
than a century before Omer-Cooper wrote, these upheavals had
been labelled by writers as 'the wars of Shaka' or 'the Zulu
wars'; today the view remains deeply entrenched among
historians and public alike that the conflicts of the period
were touched off by the explosive expansion of the Zulu king-
dom under Shaka. In a chain reaction of violence, so the
story of the mfecane goes, warring groups carried death and
destruction from the Zululand region southwards into Natal and
the eastern Cape, westward onto the highveld, and northwards
to the Limpopo river and beyond. The violence came to an end
only when most of the communities which had managed to survive
the supposed chaos of the times had been amalgamated into a
number of large defensive states under powerful kings.
Since Julian Cobbing published his now well-known critique of
the concept of the mfecane in 1988,3 a number of other histor-
ians, myself among them, have joined him in challenging the
idea that the concept has any descriptive or analytical value.
These historians do not deny that the 1820s and 1830s were a
time of often fierce conflict in much of southern Africa, but
they regard the notion of the mfecane as a fundamental
obstacle to understanding the history of the sub-continent in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.4
1. This paper draws on an earlier one, entitled 'Raiding,
trading and political change: the central and eastern
regions from the 1760s to the 1830s', which I presented to
the Second Colloquium on School History Textbooks for a
Democratic South Africa held in Rustenburg in November
1993.
2. J.D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth Century
Revolution in Bantu Africa, London, 1966.
3. J. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi: thoughts on Dithakong
and Mbolompo', Journal of African History, vol. 29 (1988),
pp. 487-519.
4. Many of the debates which have emerged since 1988 round the
concept of the mfecane are taken up in the collection of
essays currently being edited by Carolyn Hamilton under the
title, The Mfecane Aftermath. Publication jointly by
Witwatersrand University Press and Natal University Press
is due early in 1995. My thanks to the editor and pub-
lishers for permission to see pre-publication proofs of
this work.
As I see it, there are six particular sets of objections that
can be raised against the notion of the mfecane. First, it
serves to maintain the long-established segregation from each
other of histories which, it is increasingly clear to some
historians, were becoming more and more intertwined from at
least the mid-eighteenth century onwards: that is, the history
of the white-dominated societies of the expanding Cape colony,
and the history of the black societies of the southern African
interior. Second, it lumps together histories which need to
be treated separately: for example, the history of the Natal
region in the later eighteenth century, of the southern
highveld in the 1820s, of central Mozambique in the 1830s,
of Malawi in the 1840s. Third, it is voraciously and
irredeemably teleological. It has long since swallowed up the
history of the Zululand region in the later eighteenth century
by portraying it as little more than a preface to the
postulated 'Zulu explosion' of the 1820s. In Omer-Cooper's
latest treatment of it, it is similarly threatening also to
absorb the pre-1820s history of the western Transvaal, the
eastern Transvaal, Natal-Mpondoland, and the Cape northern
frontier region.5 Fourth, it makes for a heavily distorted
periodization of political change by focussing mainly on the
1820s and 1830s, and largely neglecting previous decades.
Fifth, it unproblematically attributes the often violent
political transformations of the 1820s and 1830s primarily to
the expansion of the Zulu kingdom, and underplays or neglects
wider sets of causes. In particular, it has virtually nothing
to say about the impact of forces rooted in the expansion of
the frontiers of European trading, raiding and settlement.
Sixth, it greatly exaggerates the level of violence and
destruction that took place in the 1820s and 1830s. In one
account after another, words like 'chaos', 'turmoil',
'bloodshed', 'massacres', 'holocaust' are used without reflec-
tion to describe the events of the period.
Critics of the concept of the mfecane are by no means united
in their attempts to provide alternative explanations of the
political changes which were taking place in the interior and
eastern regions of southern Africa from the mid-eighteenth
century onward. They also argue from widely divergent per-
spectives about the meanings that can be read into particular
sources of evidence. Often fierce criticisms of aspects of
their arguments, particularly of Cobbing's, have been made by
other historians.5 This is not the place to spell out in the
detail the various lines of debate which have emerged. But we
need to register that one of the effects of these debates,
5. J.D. Omer-Cooper, 'Has the Mfecane a future? A response to
the Cobbing critique'. Journal of Southern African Studies
 r
vol. 19, no. 2 (1993), pp. 273-94; J.D. Omer-Cooper, His-
tory of Southern Africa. 2nd ed., Cape Town, 1994, pp. 52-
68.
6. See Hamilton, ed., Mfecane Aftermath, in press.
both written and spoken, has been to leave numbers of readers
and listeners in a state of deep confusion.
This is hardly surprising when the participants themselves are
not agreed what they are arguing about. Critics of the
mfecane want to abandon the notion altogether, and move away
from what they see as its inescapably Zulu-centric genre of
explanations (even if, at this stage of the debate, they are
not always able to expunge the word from the titles of their
papers). Some critics of the critics, like Jeff Peires, con-
tinue to feel that the main issue has to do with the rise of
the Zulu state, and want to hold on to the established notion
of the mfecane.7 Others, like Omer-Cooper, seek to define a
new kind of mfecane so as to accommodate some of the chal-
lenges that have been made to the old one.8 Other authors,
more sympathetic to the critics, recognize the need to move on
from Zulu-centric interpretations but still want to retain the
term mfecane or difaqane as a generic designation for the
upheavals of the 1820s and 1830s.9
Confusions are compounded by the inclination of some of
Cobbing's critics to dismiss holus bolus what they call 'the
Cobbing hypothesis' because of the major flaws in his use of
evidence. Here they fail to distinguish between a general and
a particular hypothesis which emerge from his arguments. The
former, which in my view constitutes a major contribution to
South African historiography, and is difficult to gainsay, has
to do with his identification of European commercial and colo-
nial expansion as having been a major factor in the history of
the interior and east from at least the mid-eighteenth century
onward. The latter, in criticisms of which I concur, has to
do with the heavy emphasis which he places on the role of
European slave-raiding. It is perfectly possible, in fact
necessary in my view, to query the latter while holding on to
the former.
Against this background of disagreement about the nature of
the disagreements on the mfecane,10 it is understandable that
after one particular seminar a historian colleague could turn
to me with the question which I have incorporated into the
title of this paper, 'If we can't call it the mfecane, then
7. J.B. Peires, 'Paradigm deleted: the materialist interpreta-
tion of the Mfecane', Journal of Southern African Studies,
vol. 19, no. 2 (June 1993), pp. 295-313.
8. See note 4 above; also the critical comments on Omer-
Cooper's revised views in my essay, 'Beyond the concept of
the "Zulu explosion": comments on the current debate', in
Hamilton, ed., The Mfecane Aftermathf in press.
9. Neil Parsons, A New History of Southern Africa. 2nd ed. ,
London, 1993, p. vi & chs. 5 & 6.
10. For more comments on this point, see Carolyn Hamilton's
introductory essay to The Mfecane Aftermath.
what can we call it?' My answer to this question takes two
forms. The first is simply that there is no single 'it' out
there to give a name to in the first place. The issue is not
about finding a new name for a particular historical 'event'
or set of events. Nor is it about finding new causes for such
an event. It has to do with abandoning not just the name but
the whole concept of the mfecane.
In this connection, it would, I suggest, be highly instructive
to consider the effects of what Edwin Wilmsen in another con-
text has called 'the need to name'.11 We need to ask why,
since at least the mid-nineteenth century, so many students of
southern African history have had a powerful and deep-seated
need to see an 'it' in the upheavals of the 1820s and the
1830s, and to give that 'it' a name - the wars of Shaka, the
Zulu wars, and now, more singularly than ever, the mfecane.
Why is it that they want to portray a multiplicity of
disparate happenings, spread over many years and taking place
in widely separated places, as a unitary, bounded 'event', a
discrete 'thing' in the past.? Even historians who are
prepared to concede the validity of many of the criticisms
that have been mounted against the concept of the mfecane, and
to abandon this specific term, find difficulty in letting go
of the idea that the upheavals of the 1820s and 1830s
constitute a single phenomenon for which there is a single
line of explanation. This is not the place to try to answer
the question of why this is so: the history of the concept of
the mfecane needs its own separate study. My concern, rather,
is to make the point that to understand the issues at stake in
current debates on the mfecane we need to be aware of how,
over a long period of time, certain events of the 1820s and
1830s have become objectified, fetishized even, into a
nameable 'fact' of southern African history.
The second form that my answer to the question posed in the
title takes is constituted by the rest of this paper. While
the debates round Cobbing's hypotheses, and about the nature
of the evidence on which they are based, have pointed to the
urgent need for a complete reassessment of the history of the
interior and eastern regions of southern Africa in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, they have not yet
taken us much towards new conceptualizations of this history,
and new lines of research. It is time for historians who
reject the concept of the mfecane to move on from the Cobbing-
centric arguments of the last six years, and get on with the
business of articulating and researching empirical alterna-
tives to mfecane-informed history. What follows is an outline
of a possible alternative approach to explaining the political
transformations which took place in the territories north of
the Orange river and east of the Kalahari desert in the period
from the 1760s to the 1830s. In a reversal of the usual
11. E.N. Wilmsen, Land Filled with Flies: a Political Economy
of the Kalahari
 f Chicago & London, 1989, p. 26.
pattern of mfecane-informed history, I deal first with the
history of the interior, and then with that of the eastern
regions. My aim in doing this is to enable the significance
of forces for change emanating from the expansion of the Cape
colony to be appreciated, and, concomitantly, for the emer-
gence of the Zulu kingdom to be seen in a wider context than
usual.
The interior: the expansion of trade after 1760
Historians have long recognized that the later eighteenth
century saw significant political changes among the societies
of the region between the northern and central Drakensberg and
the Indian Ocean. They have often described these changes as
leading towards 'state formation', by which is meant the
processes in which numbers of relatively small-scale,
uncentralized and unstratified chiefdoms became amalagamated
into relatively large-scale, centralized and stratified
polities, or states. It is only recently that historians have
begun to recognize - perhaps not yet fully - that similar, if
less pronounced, processes were taking place at much the same
time among the Tswana-speaking societies on the south-east
fringes of the Kalahari desert. To a large extent this lag
has been a product, of the relative paucity of source material
on the history of the interior before the 1820s, and of the
difficulties of interpreting what evidence there is.
Our knowledge of the history of the interior regions before
the second half of the eighteenth century depends very largely
on oral traditions which were written down in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries by missionaries, officials and academ-
ics, nearly all of them white. Most of these traditions tell
stories of specific migrations, wars and disputes over chief-
ship, and it is difficult to work out from them the broad pat-
terns of the region's politics. Historians today still draw
heavily on the syntheses of tradition produced from the 1930s
onward by anthropologist Isaac Schapera, but, like many
scholars then and since, Schapera tended to take traditions
too much at face value as sources of evidence, and his histor-
ies stand in need of critical re-analysis. The same point
could be made of the more recent exegeses produced by Martin
Legassick and by Neil Parsons, both of which remain essential
reading.12 However, the consensus among modern-day students
of Tswana history that the final decades of the eighteenth
century were a period of increased conflict and political
expansion among the southern Tswana chiefdoms seems well-
enough founded. The most important of these polities appear
12. M. Legassick, 'The Sotho-Tswana peoples before 1800', in
L. Thompson, ed., African Societies in Southern Africaf
London, 1969, ch. 5; Parsons, New History of Southern Afri-
ca. 2nd ed., ch. 3.
to have been those of the Ngwaketse, the Hurutshe, the Kwena,
the Kgatla, the Rolong and the Tlhaping.13
It seems to me highly significant that these chiefdoms were
situated at or near the intersection of several well-
established long-distance trade routes. Evidence from Euro-
pean travellers who were reaching this region by the 1810s and
1820s indicates that one of these led eastwards to the Indian
Ocean 800 kilometres away, and another south-westwards to the
Orange river valley and the Cape frontier regions.14 Accord-
ing to the findings of recent archaeological research, goods
from Muslim and Portuguese traders on the east coast had been
reaching the interior, if in small quantities, for many
centuries before this.15 Snippets of information recorded by
European officials and travellers from Khoekhoe informants in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries suggest that trade
between the southern Tswana and Khoekhoe communities to the
south had also been in existence for a long time.16
A third long-distance route may have led from the southern
Tswana region to the north and north-west. Archaeological
evidence cited by Wilmsen indicates that goods acquired from
Portuguese traders in Angola were reaching what is now north-
western Botswana by the early seventeenth century,17 and it is
possible that in due course this trade may have extended to
the eastern and south-eastern edges of the Kalahari.
13. See the works cited in the previous note; also Andrew
Manson, 'The Hurutshe in the Marico district of the Trans-
vaal, 1848-1914', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cape
Town, 1990, pp. 42-53.
14. M. Wilson, 'The Sotho, Venda and Tsonga', in M. Wilson &
L. Thompson, eds., The Oxford History of South Africa, vol.
1, Oxford, 1969, pp. 149-53.
15. The evidence is summarized in T. Maggs & G. Whitelaw, ' A
review of recent archaeological research on food-producing
communities in southern Africa', Journal of African His-
tory, vol. 32 (1991), pp. 14-15.
16. C. Saunders, 'Early knowledge of the Sotho: seventeenth
and eighteenth century accounts of the Tswana', Quarterly
Bull. S.A. Library, vol. 20 (1965-6), pp. 63-4; R. Elphick,
Kraal and Castle: Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South
Africa. New Haven & London, 1977, pp. 65, 67; G. Okihiro,
'Precolonial economic change among the Tlhaping, c.1795-
1817', Internat. Jnl. Afr. Hist. Studies, vol. 17 (1984),
pp. 70-71; G. Harinck, 'Interaction between Xhosa and Khoi:
emphasis on the period 1620-1750', in Thompson, ed. , Afri-
can Societies, pp. 160, 164.
17. Wilmsen, Land Filled with Flies
 r pp. 76, 88; E.N. Wilmsen,
'For "trinkets" such as beads: Khoisan participation in the
European Atlantic trade', unpubl. conference paper, Tutz-
ing, Germany, July 1994 (my thanks to the author for
permission to cite this paper).
Evidence from early travel accounts and from archaeological
research cited by recent commentators indicates that
commodities imported into the interior from maritime sources
were largely prestige items like beads, cloth and cowrie
shells. In exchange, traders on the coast required ivory,
copper, skins and pelts. There is no evidence that goods were
carried directly between the coast and the interior: rather,
they passed through numerous local trading networks in which
both foreign and locally produced goods were exchanged.18 The
volume of goods traded was never high, but it is likely that
their value was enough to encourage chiefs to try to keep con-
trol over trade as far as possible for themselves. Disputes
over trade were probably a frequent cause of conflict between
chiefs and local community leaders, and between different
chiefdoms.
Martin Legassick's researches of more than twenty-five years
ago on the history of the Cape northern frontier region indi-
cate that in the later eighteenth century the volume of trade
along the route between the southern Tswana chiefdoms and the
Khoekhoe communities to the south was beginning to expand. By
the 1760s, the frontier of Cape colonial settlement had
reached the Nuweveld and Sneeuberg mountains, and Dutch stock-
farmers were seasonally grazing their livestock further north
towards the Orange river. More and more they came into
contact with the groups of Khoekhoe pastoralists 'who lived
along the river. Though it was illegal for colonists to trade
across the colonial boundary, frontier farmers traded beads,
firearms and horses to the Khoekhoe in exchange for cattle.
In turn, the Khoekhoe exchanged beads and other manufactures
with the Tlhaping to the north of the Orange in return for
cattle. With the Khoekhoe and the Tlhaping as middlemen,
goods from the Cape colony began to move into southern Tswana
chiefdoms in increased quantity.^
At much the same time, the we 11-documented researches of Alan
Smith and David Hedges tell us, there was a marked expansion
of the ivory trade at Delagoa Bay in southern Mozambique.20
18. For general comments on trade among the southern Tswana to
the early nineteenth century, see M.C. Legassick, 'The Gri-
qua, the Sotho-Tswana, and the missionaries, 1780-1840: the
politics of a frontier zone', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, UCLA,
1969, pp. 225-41; Okihiro, 'Precolonial economic change
among the Tlhaping', IJAHS. vol. 17 (1984), pp. 68-78; A.
Manson, 'The Hurutshe and the formation of the Transvaal
State, 1835-1875', IJAHS, vol. 25 (1992), pp. 87-8.
19. Legassick, 'The Griqua', unpubl. thesis, pp. 126-33.
20. A. Smith, 'The trade of Delagoa Bay as a factor in Nguni
politics, 1750-1835', in Thompson, ed., African Societiesr
ch. 8; A. Smith, 'The struggle for control of southern
Mocambique, 1720-1835', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, UCLA, 1970,
pp. 162-5, 190-5; D. Hedges, 'Trade and politics in
southern Mozambique and Zululand in the eighteenth and ear-
From the 1760s onwards, English and Indian merchants were com-
ing from India in increasing numbers to buy ivory from the
chiefs round the bay in exchange for cloth, beads, and metal.
Though it was chiefdoms nearer the bay which were most direct-
ly affected by the growth of this trade, some historians have
suggested that its impact was felt in the southern Tswana
region as well.21
Also in this period, trade between southern Tswana chiefdoms
and others further north may have been expanding. Wilmsen
brings to our attention that Portuguese trading activity in
southern Angola was expanding at this time, and that by the
1770s beads from this commerce were reaching as far south as
the Orange river.22 Among the Tswana on the eastern edges of
the Kalahari, Parsons argues, ivory and furs from north-west
Botswana were in increasing demand in these years.23
The interior: the expansion of the 'firearms frontier'
It was not only through the expansion of trade from the south-
west and from the east that influences from the outside world
were felt among the southern Tswana chiefdoms in the later
eighteenth century. As Legassick's seminal and richly tex-
tured works have long since revealed, the advance of the Cape
colonial frontier of settlement brought closer the frontier of
raiding.24 Official and unofficial commandos marauded
northwards for livestock and for Bushman women and children,
whom the Dutch colonists wanted as labourers on their stock
farms. (The term 'Bushmen' is here used as a designation for
the members, most of them probably Khoisan-speaking, of fluid,
unstable, impermanent groupings which lived by varying
combinations of hunting, gathering, herding, trading and raid-
ing.) As the area dominated by the Dutch expanded, groups of
Khoekhoe and Bushmen, many of which were already in conflict
with the frontier farmers, were sgueezed out into the arid
regions along the middle and lower Orange river. Here they
came into competition and conflict with other Khoekhoe and
Bushman groups which were already living there.
ly nineteenth centuries', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, London Uni-
versity, 1978, chs. 3, 6.
21. Parsons, New History, p. 48; P. Delius, The Land Belongs
to Us: the Pedi Polity, the Boers and the British in the
Nineteenth Century Transvaal. Johannesburg, 1983, p. 18.
22. Wilmsen, Land Filled with Fliesr pp. 88, 91, 95.
23. N. Parsons, 'Pre-difaqane wars in the west', unpubl. con-
ference paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 1991, p. 3.
24. Legassick, 'The Griqua', unpubl. thesis, chs. 2, 3; M.
Legassick, 'The northern frontier to c.1840: the rise and
decline of the Griqua people', in R. Elphick & H. Giliomee,
eds., The Shaping of South African Society. 1652-1840r Cape
Town, 1989 (1st ed. 1979), ch. 8.
Recent studies by Legassick and by Nigel Penn, using official
archival documents, unpublished missionary records and pub-
lished travel accounts as sources, complement older work by
Legassick himself and by Shula Marks in charting the impact of
the expansion of the frontier on the indigenous inhabitants.25
The prime effect was the breakdown of established pastoralist
and hunting and gathering economies, and the emergence of
mixed raiding bands of Khoekhoe, Bushmen, and Tswana, many of
them equipped with guns and horses. Some of these groups were
joined by runaway slaves and by bandits and deserters, both
white and 'coloured', from the Cape colony. They raided live-
stock from one another, and from the Dutch to the south. By
the 1780s, at least, they were also making depredations on
Tswana communities to the north.26 The researches of Miklos
Szalay and, more recently, of Elizabeth Eldredge, go far
beyond the older frontier studies of P.J. van der Merwe in
revealing the extent to which these bands also raided for
women and children from weaker Bushman communities, and sold
them as slaves to the Dutch.27 (In reaction to Cobbing's
slaving hypothesis, some historians have insisted that not all
labourers on Boer farms were slaves, and that the status of
Bushmen in Boer-dominated society ranged from that of slaves
through various degrees of serfdom to that of clients. The
point is an important one, but it seems to me difficult to
call those labourers whoe were seized and kept in servitude by
force anything other than slaves.) By the early years of the
nineteenth century, these groups, which were collectively
known as Kora or Korana, were a major destabilizing force
along the middle and lower Orange. Though direct evidence on
25. Legassick, 'The Griqua', unpubl. thesis, pp. 60-71, 133-
41, 241-7; Legassick, 'The northern frontier', in Elphick &
Giliomee, eds., Shaping, pp. 368-76; S. Marks, 'Khoisan
resistance to the Dutch in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries', Jnl. Afr. Hist.. vol. 13 (1972), pp. 72-9; N.
Penn, 'Labour, land and livestock in the Western Cape dur-
ing the eighteenth century: the Khoisan and the colonists',
in W. James & M. Simons, eds.. The Angry Divide: Social and
Economic History of the Western Caper Cape Town, 1989, pp.
13-18.
26. Legassick, 'The northern frontier', in Elphick & Giliomee,
eds., pp. 369, 374.
27. M. Szalay, Ethnologie und Geschichte: Zur Grundlegung
einer Ethnologischen Geschichtsschreibung. Berlin, 1983,
ch. 6 (my thanks to the author for making the English
translation of this chapter, which he plans to publish,
available to me); E. Eldredge, 'Slave-raiding across the
Cape frontier', in E. Eldredge & F. Morton, eds., Slavery
in South Africa: Captive Labor on the Dutch Frontier,
Boulder, Westview Press, in press, ch. 4 (my thanks to
Elizabeth Eldredge for making a draft of this chapter
available to me).
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the subject is very thin, it is likely that they posed a con-
tinual threat to Tswana stock-keeping communities to the north
and north-east.
Sometime towards the end of the 1790s a new element was added
to the politics of the middle Orange region with the arrival
of several groups of Griqua from lower down the river. These
people were pastoralists, largely of Khoekhoe descent, who
were seeking to escape from the disturbances that were being
caused by the expansion of Dutch stock farmers towards the
lower Orange. They settled along a line of springs near the
junction of the Orange and Vaal in territory occupied by
communities of Kora and Bushmen, numbers of whom had little
option but to join them as clients.28
Like the Kora, the Griqua were equipped with guns and horses,
and some groups took to raiding. The more important Griqua
leaders, however, were interested less in raiding than in
livestock-keeping, in hunting, and in trying to break into the
well established trade between the Tswana and the Cape colony.
Some groups even tried to cultivate crops. In 1801, one
leader, seeking protection from rival groups, and also wanting
to establish closer commercial links with the colonial world,
arranged for missionaries from the Cape to begin work among
his followers. By the 1820s, other missionaries had begun
operations among certain of the southern Tswana chiefdoms. To
support themselves, some of them became part-time traders.
Several became influential political advisers to chiefs. From
this period dates the beginning of the more or less con-
tinuously documented history of the region north of the middle
Orange.2^
28. Legassick, 'The Griqua', unpubl. thesis, pp. 146-8; J.S.
Marais, The Cape Coloured People 1652-1937. Johannesburg,
1968 (1st publ. London, 1939), pp. 32-5; R. Ross, Adam
Kok's Griauas, Cambridge, 1976, pp. 12-15.
29. On the Griqua and neighbouring societies in the first two
decades of the nineteenth century, see Legassick, 'The
Griqua', thesis, pp. 151-9, 163-8, & chs. 4 & 6; Legassick,
'The northern frontier', in Elphick & Giliomee, eds..
Shaping, pp. 376-90; R. Wagner, 'Coenraad de Buys in
Transorangia', in The Societies of Southern Africa in the
19th and 20th Centuries, vol. 4, Institute of Commonwealth
Studies, university of London, 1974, pp. 1-8; J. du Bruyn,
'Die aanvangsjare van die Christelike sending orider die
Tlhaping', unpubl. M.A. thesis, Unisa, 1980, chs. 3 & 4; R.
Beck, 'The legalization and development of trade on the
Cape frontier, 1817-1830', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, Indiana
University, 1987, ch. 6; M. Kinsman, 'Populists and
patriarchs: the transformation of the captaincy at Griqua
Town, 1804-1822', in A. Mabin, ed., Organization and Eco-
nomic Change. Southern African Studies vol. 5, Johannes-
burg, 1989, pp. 1-20.
11
The history of the relatively settled Griqua communities has
attracted its fair share of researchers. Much less well known
is the contemporary history of small groups of Xhosa which, as
a result of the increasing instability of the eastern frontier
of the Cape, were quitting the region and establishing them-
selves along the middle Orange. Work by Peter Kallaway and
Elizabeth Anderson has served to illuminate the role which
they played in further destabilizing this already volatile
region. They attracted followings of Khoekhoe, Bushmen, and
refugees from the colony, and, with the firearms which they
had acquired, raided widely in the region round the middle
Orange and lower Vaal. Though they mostly avoided attacking
the stronger of the Griqua groups, the raids which they made
against the Tlhaping threatened to disrupt the trade which
these groups were trying to establish to the northward.30
It is against this background of expanding trade to the south,
east and north, and of increasing political instability in the
regions to the south, that we need to place the history of the
southern Tswana chiefdoms in the last two decades or so of the
eighteenth century and the first two of the nineteenth. The
main factors which led to conflict and expansion among them
were, I would argue, a combination of rivalry for control of
trade routes and ivory-producing areas, and the need for
protection against Kora, Griqua, Xhosa and Dutch raiders from
the south. In the south, the Tlhaping, in alliance with some
Kora groups, competed for dominance with one of the Rolong
chiefdoms. Further north, the Ngwaketse broke away from a
Kwena group and established a separate chiefdom which expanded
rapidly in size and strength. It came into conflict with both
the Tlhaping and the Rolong, and with the Hurutshe chiefdom,
which was also expanding.3*
It was probably during this period that there began the con-
centration of settlement which produced the large southern
Tswana towns remarked on by European visitors in the early
decades of the nineteenth century. There has been a good deal
of debate in the literature about their origins: recently
archaeologist Tom Huffman has argued that the process most
probably began in the eighteenth century, 'perhaps not before
AD 1750', and that it was due primarily to defensive needs in
a time of 'tremendous insecurity'. As I do in this paper,
30. P. Kallaway, 'Danster and the Xhosa of the Gariep:
towards a political economy of the Cape frontier 1790-
1820', African Studies, vol. 41 (1982), pp. 143-60; E.
Anderson, A History of the Xhosa of the Northern Cape 1795-
1879. Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town,
1987, ch. 2; Legassick, 'The Griqua', thesis, pp. 248-50.
31. Legassick, 'The Griqua', thesis, pp. 251-80; Parsons, New
History, pp. 48-50; Manson, 'The Hurutshe', unpubl. thesis,
pp. 47-53; A. Manson, 'Conflict on the western
highveld/southern Kalahari, c.1750-18 20', unpubl.
conference paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 1991.
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Huffman draws on Legassick's work to argue that this
insecurity was caused primarily by raids from the south on the
part of Griqua, Kora and Xhosa.32
By the early nineteenth century, when the first European
travellers visited them, some of these towns had populations
of ten or fifteen thousand. At these places, conflicts over
grazing and agricultural land may have intensified. Periodic
droughts were probably another factor in contributing to
rising levels of social and political tension. These were not
simply internal 'African' conflicts, for from the 1810s, at
least, white gunmen like the well-known Coenraad de Buys, as
well as white missionaries, were also playing a role in local
politics.33 Parsons's work indicates that fighting was becom-
ing fiercer as chiefs sought not only to seize cattle from
rival polities, but also to conquer them and eliminate their
leaders. He concludes, 'By 1820 warfare was so widespread
among the western Tswana that hardly a chiefdom had not seen
its chief recently killed in battle'.34 The implications of
this statement, first made twelve years ago, have entirely
escaped those historians who want to hold on to the notion of
a Zulu-caused difaqane that supposedly began on the highveld
only after 1820.
There is a certain amount of evidence that intensified con-
flict among the southern Tswana chiefdoms spilt over south and
and east into the territories across the Vaal river. This, I
suggest, is one possible reading of evidence cited by D.F. El-
lenberger in his History of the Basuto that in the early years
of the nineteenth century the Taung were beginning to attack
and subjugate neighbouring chiefdoms in what is now the north-
ern and central Orange Free State.35 Further to the east, one
of the Tlokwa chiefdoms also seems to have been growing in
power, possibly, as Sanders suggests, because it was situated
in a locality from which its leaders could control an east-
west trade over the Drakensberg escarpment.36 Pressures on
32. T. Huffman, 'Archaeological evidence and conventional ex-
planations of Southern Bantu settlement patterns', Africaf
vol. 56 (1986), esp. pp. 291-3. The quotations are from p.
292.
33. On the role of white gunmen see Wagner, 'Coenraad de
Buys', pp. 2-4; Manson, 'Conflict on the western highveld',
unpubl. paper, p. 6.
34. Parsons, New History. 2nd ed., p. 52.
35. D.F. Ellenberger, History of the Basuto. Ancient and Mod-
ern, London, 1912, p. 60. See also T. Maggs, Iron Age Com*
munities of the Southern Highveld. Pietermaritzburg, 1976,
pp. 309-10; Parsons, New History, 2nd ed., p. 52.
36. P. Sanders, Moshoeshoe: Chief of the Sotho, London, 1975,
p. 19. On trade among the Sotho of the southern highveld
in the early nineteenth century, see E. Eldredge, A South
African Kingdom: the Pursuit of Security in Nineteenth-
Century Lesotho. Cambridge, 1993, pp. 19-25.
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the Sotho-speaking chiefdoms of the southern highveld came not
only from the zone of conflict among the Tswana to the north-
west, but also from what Legassick has called the 'firearms
frontier' along the middle Orange to the south-west.37 By the
1810s Boer farmers were expanding towards the river in what is
now the Colesberg area,38 and raiding by Boers, Kora and Gri-
qua for cattle and slaves may by this time have been reaching
as far as the Caledon valley. More and more, I suggest, the
existing political order in the region was beginning to come
under threat.
The interior: the upheavals of the 1820s and 1830s
In the early and mid-1820s, conflicts among the Sotho and
Tswana chiefdoms of the highveld became more intense. The
commonly held view is that this was because of the intrusion
at this time of three groups from east of the Drakensberg.
These were the Hlubi and the Ngwane, who moved onto the high-
veld south of the Vaal, and the Khumalo, or Ndebele as they
were later known, who established themselves near the upper
Vaal in what is now the south-eastern Transvaal. It is
usually assumed that these groups had been driven out of the
Natal-Zululand region by the expanding Zulu chiefdom, but
recent research suggests that the realities were much more
complex. They were squeezed out of a zone where conflict was
intensifying as a result not only of the expansion of the Zulu
but also of the Ndwandwe, and, possibly, of slave-raiding from
Delagoa Bay (see below).
The intrusion of the Hlubi and the Ngwane certainly contrib-
uted to the widespread raiding and social disruption which
took place on the southern highveld in the 1820s. But it is
impossible to understand the origin of these upheavals without
taking into account the extent to which the region north of
the Orange had already been destabilized by the expansion
northwards of the Cape colonial frontier zone. The Hlubi and
Ngwane did not burst onto a peaceful and stable scene, as num-
bers of history books imply: they were pushed into an area
where political tensions had been rising for many years.
This point is central to the scenario sketched out by Julian
Cobbing in the article of 1988 which touched off the current
debates on the mfecane. In various forms, the point had been
hinted at a number of times before by other authors, but
invariably in conjunction with assumptions about a Zulu-
centred mfecane/difaqane which prevented it from being devel-
oped further. Thus, twenty-five years ago, Martin Legassick
37. Legassick, 'The northern frontier', in Elphick & Giliomee,
eds., Shaping, pp. 369, 375.
38. P.J. van der Merwe, Die Noordwaartse Beweaina van die
Boere voor die Groot Trek (1770-1842). The Hague, 1937, p.
118.
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could argue that the political instability of the 1820s in
'Transorangia' was a product not simply of 'the Difaqane' but
also of 'the comparable, though usually less cataclysmic, ten-
sions engendered by the spread of the southern frontier'.39
At the same time, William Lye made the point that 'The Sotho
people faced a more lasting, and in some ways more destruc-
tive, threat than the Difaqane in the plundering raids of the
numerous communities of Korana and Griqua'.40 Wagner sug-
gested that the raids of Coenraad de Buys probably contributed
to the climate of 'dislocation and apprehension7 in which the
'Difaqane' was to 'thrive'.41 I have already cited Huffman's
recognition that raiding from the south had made an important
contribution to the instability of the southern Tswana region
in the later eighteenth century.
It is only now, after Cobbing's intervention, that historians
are beginning to recognize the full significance of this fac-
tor. Elizabeth Eldredge, who has sharply criticized Cobbing
on other counts, accepts basic aspects of the case which he
makes in this connection, and her own forthcoming essay on the
slave trade across the northern frontier serves to reinforce
it.42 While attempting to appropriate them to a revised con-
cept of the mfecane, even John Omer-Cooper accepts the
validity of parts of Cobbing's line of argument.43 Merinda
van Zyl, who stands outside the narrow circle of mfecane
debaters, has independently drawn on Legassick's and Cobbing's
work to argue that the upheavals in the interior, which she
continues to call the Difaqane, were the products not of 'Zulu
refugees' but of raiding and counter-raiding set in motion by
the expansion of the Cape colonial frontier.44
Before the impact of the thrust of the Hlubi and Ngwane into
the southern highveld can be properly understood, the whole
history of the region in the 1820s - and before, for that
matter - needs to be rethought from scratch. A revised
version, I would insist, should concentrate on trying to
39. Legassick, 'The Griqua', unpubl. thesis, p. 327; also p.
377.
40. W. Lye, 'The Sotho wars in the interior of South Africa,
1822-1837', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, UCLA, p. 111.
41. Wagner, 'Coenraad de Buys', p. 5.
42. E. Eldredge, 'Sources of conflict in southern Africa,
c.1800-30: the "mfecane" reconsidered'. Journal of African
History, vol. 33 (1992), pp. 15-16, 25; Eldredge, 'Slave-
raiding across the Cape frontier', in press.
43. J.D. Omer-Cooper, 'Has the Mfecane a future? A response to
the Cobbing critique'. Journal of Southern African Studiesr
vol. 19 (1993), pp. 286, 288, 290.
44. M.E. van Zyl, 'The quest for cattle, the firearm frontier
and the Difaqane', Acta Academica. vol. 24 (4), (1992), pp.
58-73.
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provide a comprehensive politics of the period, and not merely
another repetitive account of fights and migrations. Current
versions of this history are descended primarily from
syntheses originally produced in the 1960s and 1970s, particu-
larly those of William Lye,45 and for the most part have
broken little new ground. An essential starting-point for a
rethought history must be a critical re-examination of what
has long been the standard source-book on the subject, Ellen-
berger's History of the Basuto. first published in 1912. The
revealing, if brief, comments on the production of this work
made by Sanders need to be carried much further.46 A revised
history would, among other things, need to assess the impact
on the Sotho-speaking chiefdoms of the Caledon region of the
increasing pressures exerted in the 1820s not only by the
Griqua to the west and the Dutch to the south, but also by ex-
panding powers like the Ndebele kingdom to the north and the
Zulu kingdom to the east.
Also needed is a re-examination of the significance of the so-
called battle of Dithakong in 1823. A great deal has been
made by generations of colonial and colonial-influenced
writers of this event, when a force of armed and mounted
Griqua, mobilized at the behest of the missionary Robert
Moffat, beat off/attacked a group of raiders from the highveld
who had crossed the lower Vaal into the territory of the
Tlhaping. A lot of ink has recently been spilt over Julian
Cobbing's re-interpretation of the affair, in the course of
which he provocatively (and not convincingly, in the eyes of
numbers of readers, including myself) characterized Moffat as
a slave-raider. Whether the episode was a major historical
event, or whether it was an encounter which has received
disproportionate publicity because of the presence of literate
observers at the scene are questions which have not yet been
answered.
In the Caledon valley, the evidence seems clear enough, the
dominant power by the mid-1820s was the intrusive Ngwane
chiefdom under Matiwane. In the face of raids made by the
Griqua and other groups, the Ngwane moved away south-eastwards
into the territories of the Thembu. As is well-known, in 1828
they were attacked and broken up by a force of British troops
supported by a large army of Thembu, Gcaleka, Mpondo, and Cape
settlers, all eager to seize cattle and people. This episode
45. Lye, 'The Sotho wars', unpubl. thesis, ch. 2; W. Lye, 'The
Difaaane: the mfecane in the southern Sotho area, 1822-24',
Journal of African History, vol. 8 (1967), pp. 107-31. See
also Legassick, 'The Griqua', unpubl. thesis, ch. 7.
46. P. Sanders, Moshoeshoe: Chief of the Sotho, London, 1975,
p. 332. I have not yet managed to get hold of E. Maloka,
'Missionary historiography and ethnography: Casalis, Ar-
bousset and Ellenberger, and the history of nineteenth-
century Lesotho', unpubl. Hons, thesis, UCT, 1988.
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has become the subject of some controversy;47 if it is to be
properly understood, it needs to be seen in the context of a
thorough re-examination of British policy on the Cape eastern
frontier at this period, as well as of the politics of the
contemporary Xhosa-speaking chiefdoms.
The migration and destruction of the Ngwane chiefdom opened
the way for the emergence of two new rival powers on the
Caledon. These were the Tlokwa chiefdom under Sekonyela in
the north, and, further south, the Mokotedi chiefdom under
Moshweshwe. Because of his later political successes in
building up the Sotho kingdom, Moshweshwe has earned much more
attention from historians than have other leaders of the
period. Needed now is a history of the southern highveld in
the 1820s and 1830s which avoids the common Sotho-centric
teleologies, and provides a critical explanation of how
Mokotedi domination of the Caledon region came to be estab-
lished. A revised history should not lose sight of the fact
that to the south-west, another focus of power, if a more
loosely organized one, was emerging in the form of the Griqua-
dominated polity of Adam Kok II. Kok had been encouraged by
missionaries to settle at Philippolis near the Orange river in
1826. He exercised a weak authority over a turbulent follow-
ing of Griqua, Kora, Bushmen, Tswana and Sotho. Further down
the Orange, Andries Waterboer ruled another Griqua polity
centred on Griquatown. Other small communities of Griqua and
Kora lived along the middle Orange, the lower Vaal, and the
Caledon.48 The roles played by all these groups need to be
considered in an integrated regional history.
The history of the region north of the Vaal river in the 1820s
and 1830s also needs to be comprehensively rethought. The
established academic analyses of Lye, Morrow, Cobbing and Ras-
mussen all belong to the period of the 1960s and 1970s, and
little has been done since to subject their findings to criti-
cal analysis, or to re-interrogate the sources on which they
are based. The rise to dominance of the Ndebele kingdom under
Mzilikazi will no doubt remain the central theme of a revised
history, but it needs to be placed in a much broader context
than has hitherto been done. A future political history of
the northern highveld in the period under review would need to
try to establish a clearer picture than we have at present of
the politics and economics of the bewildering succession of
raids and counter-raids among the chiefdoms of the region. It
would also need to provide an integrated analysis of the
impact on the region's affairs of cattle raids by Griqua and
47. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp. 500-3, 507-9; J.
Peires, 'Matiwane's road to Mbholompo: a reprieve for the
Mfecane?' in Hamilton, ed., The Mfecane Aftermath, in
press.
48. Marais, Cape Coloured People, pp. 36-42; Legassick, 'The
Griqua', unpubl. thesis, ch. 8; Ross, Adam Kok's Griquasr
ch. 3.
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Kora from the south and by the Zulu from the east, of slaving
by the Portuguese and their African allies from Delagoa Bay,
of the expansion of the Pedi and Swazi chiefdoms to the east,
and of the upheavals which were taking place north of the
Limpopo river in the 1830s.
The east: trade and politics. 1760-1820
Over the last fifteen years or so, the history of the terri-
tories east of the highveld in the period from the mid-
eighteenth century to the 1830s has been subjected to more by
way of critical revision than has that of the interior
regions. The empirical work done by researchers like David
Hedges, Jeff Guy, Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, Carolyn
Hamilton and myself has largely supplanted earlier writings.
The re-evaluations made by Carolyn Hamilton and myself of what
has since 1929 been the standard work on the Natal region in
this period, A.T. Bryant's Olden Times in Zululand and Na-
tal,4^ have opened the way for thorough-going reconceptualiza-
tions of its history. The publication since 1976 of important
new source material in the volumes of the James Stuart Archive
has provided a basis for fresh research work to be done well
into the future.50
In the territories east of the highveld, patterns of political
change cannot be traced even in outline before the mid-
eighteenth century. Evidence from recorded oral traditions
synthesized by the researchers mentioned above suggests that
in the second half of the century a number of chiefdoms over a
wide region were beginning to expand, and frequently to clash
with one another and with their smaller neighbours. As
already mentioned, Smith and Hedges have demonstrated that
long-distance trade through Delagoa Bay was growing rapidly
after about 1760, with ivory going out and cloth, beads and
metal coming in. It is a likely hypothesis, in my view, that
competition for this trade was a major factor in increasing
the level of political conflict in the region.
There is some consensus among researchers that, by the end of
the eighteenth century at least five enlarged chiefdoms had
emerged in the hinterland of the bay. To the north-west, near
the Olifants river, Delius indicates, the Maroteng (or Pedi)
49. J. Wright & C. Hamilton, 'Traditions and transformations:
the Phongolo-Mzimkhulu region in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries', in A. Duminy and B. Guest,
eds., Natal and Zululand from Earliest Times to 1910: a
History. Pietermaritzburg, 1989,pp. 49-82; J. Wright, 'A.T
Bryant and "the wars of Shaka"', History in Africa, no. 18
(1991), pp. 409-25.
50. C. Webb & J. Wright, eds., The James Stuart Archive of Re-
corded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu
and Neighbouring Peoples. 4 vols. so far published,
Pietermaritzburg, 1976-1986.
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chiefdom was establishing control over the trade routes from
Delagoa Bay to the interior.51 At the bay itself, Smith and
Hedges make clear, the Tembe and Maputo chiefdoms were compe-
ting for control over trade routes to the west and south.52
Further south, the Ndwandwe and Mthethwa chiefdoms were becom-
ing rivals for domination of the region north and south of the
White Mfolozi: Hedges suggests that struggles for control of
trade to the bay from the south may have been a factor in
their conflict.53
As these chiefdoras expanded, numbers of groups on their
margins were pushed out. Among them were the Dlamini, who
moved from the region south of Delagoa Bay into what is now
Swaziland.54 They formed the nucleus of what later became the
Swazi kingdom. Other groups, Hamilton and I have argued,
began coming together for defensive purposes.55 Among them
were enlarged chiefdoms like those of the Hlubi and Qwabe in
what is now Natal.56 The expansion of the Qwabe, my own
researches reveal, in turn pushed other chiefdoms southwards
along the coast. Some migrant groups ended up in the northern
Transkei, where their arrival was probably an important factor
in stimulating the expansion of the Mpondo chiefdom.57
As larger chiefdoms started to emerge, whether in response to
rivalries over trade or for defensive purposes, conflicts
between them seem to have become more intense. Hedges argues
51. Delius, The Land Belongs to Us. pp. 13, 15-19.
52. Smith, 'Struggle for control of southern Mocambique',
unpubl. thesis, pp. 223-4; Hedges, 'Trade and polities',
unpubl. thesis, ch. 5.
53. On the expansion of the Ndwandwe, see Hedges, 'Trade and
polities', unpubl. thesis, pp. 155-65. On the expansion of
the Mthethwa, see Hedges, 'Trade and polities', pp. 177-86;
also C. Hamilton, 'Ideology, oral traditions and the strug-
gle for power in the early Zulu kingdom', unpubl. M.A.
thesis. University of the Witwatersrand, 1986, pp. 102-19.
54. P. Bonner, Kings. Commoners and Concessionaires: the
Evolution and Dissolution of the Nineteenth-Century Swazi
State. Johannesburg, 1983, pp. 9-12.
55. Wright & Hamilton, 'Traditions and transformations', p.
65.
56. J. Wright, 'The dynamics of power and conflict in the
Thukela-Mzimkhulu region in the late 18th and early 19th
centuries', unpubl. thesis. University of the
Witwatersrand, 1990, pp. 34-9.
57. Wright, 'Dynamics of power', unpubl. thesis, pp. 40-9; J.
Wright, 'Political transformations in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu
region of Natal in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries', in Hamilton, ed., Mfecane Aftermath, in press.
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that the decline of the ivory trade and the rise of a trade in
cattle at Delagoa Bay in the 1790s further exacerbated politi-
cal tensions.58 Over the years, numbers of historians have
repetitively argued that a severe drought, which is commonly
supposed to have taken place in the very early years of the
nineteenth century, was another factor in the escalation of
political struggles in the Natal region. The sources of this
notion have never been critically examined, and it is likely,
in my view, to turn out to be one of those enduring myths
which lodge so easily in the fabric of mfecane-informed
history. Which is not to say that climatological factors were
not important in the history of the period: they undoubtedly
were, but until in-depth research on the subject has been pub-
lished, it is very difficult to make more than vague and gen-
eralized statements on it.
Another factor in the politics of the Delagoa Bay hinterland
by the 1810s may possibly have been the growth of a slave
trade at the bay. This idea was first argued by Julian
Cobbing, who, in his 1988 article sees this trade as having
been significant since well back in the eighteenth century.59
His argument has been heavily criticized by Elizabeth
Eldredge, who insists that the existing evidence indicates
that the slave trade at Delagoa Bay would have been of no
importance before about 1823.60 My own opinion is that
Cobbing heavily overstates his case, and that the trade at
Delagoa Bay is unlikely to have taken off before the rise of
exports to Brazil after 1810. I would also argue that some of
the evidence cited by Eldredge is more ambiguous about the
timing of the origins of the trade than she allows for, and it
may possibly have been expanding, if on a small scale, before
1820. In a more recent essay, Eldredge has in fact slightly
modified her argument in this direction.61
One of the reasons why I want to hold on to the idea of a
pre-1820 origin for the slave trade is so that it can be
deployed as a possible explanation for the intensification of
conflict which took place south of the Phongolo in, it seems,
the late 1810s. Recorded traditions suggest that the Ndwandwe
were acting with an unusual degree of aggression towards their
neighbours at this time: as I have argued elsewhere, this may
have been in part because they were coming increasing pressure
from the effects of slaving activities to the north.62
58. Hedges, 'Trade and polities', unpubl. thesis, pp. 145-52.
59. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp. 503-7.
60. Eldredge, 'Sources of conflict', pp. 3-15.
61. E. Eldredge, 'The Delagoa Bay hinterland: politics, trade,
slaves and slave-raiding before 1850', in Eldredge &
Morton, eds., Slavery in South Africaf in press (my thanks
to Elizabeth Eldredge for providing me with a draft of this
chapter).
62. Wright, 'Dynamics of power', unpubl. thesis, pp. 211-12;
Wright, 'Political transformations', in Hamilton, ed., Mfecane
20
As is well known, the outcome of the conflicts was the estab-
lishment of Ndwandwe domination over the region from the
Phongolo south towards the White Mfolozi. The common view is
that the Ndwandwe were soon afterwards defeated, and their
chiefdom broken up, in an attack by the Zulu under Shaka, who
had been consolidating their power in the territory south of
the Mfolozi. This view stands in need of re-examination.
Hamilton's and my research into the early history of the Zulu
kingdom indicate that it is unlikely that at this stage it had
anything like the power single-handedly to attack and destroy
the better-established and much more powerful Ndwandwe polity.
There is little doubt that the Ndwandwe chiefdom broke up soon
after a Ndwandwe raid southwards had been beaten off by the
Zulu, but the view that the Zulu then proceeded to attack and
destroy the Ndwandwe chiefdom is based very much on the tradi-
tions of the Zulu rather than those of the Ndwandwe. Recently
recorded Ndwandwe traditions, which themselves need critical
assessment, point by contrast towards internal political ten-
sions as the prime cause of the chiefdom's break-up.63
Subsequently the Ndwandwe ruling house and its adherents under
Zwide moved into southern Swaziland and then into the eastern
Transvaal, where, it seems, they attacked and broke up the
Pedi chiefdom.64 The Khumalo under Mzilikazi moved to the
south-eastern Transvaal, the Msane to eastern Swaziland, and
the Jele (or Ngoni) and Gaza to the Delagoa Bay region.65
Another largely unexamined assumption of mfecane-informed
history is that all these groups fled as 'refugees' from the
Zulu under Shaka. This view neglects the possible impact of
other factors, like the expansion of the Delagoa Bay slave
trade, and does not allow for the possibility that these
groups may have moved on their own initiatives.
The break-up of the Ndwandwe polity and the migration of these
groups opened the way for the Zulu to extend their rule north
of the White Mfolozi. Contrary to the common view, it is un-
likely that at this stage their domination extended beyond the
Mkhuze river, for their hold on the polity which they had
Aftermath, in press.
63. For exmple, see the archives of the Swaziland Oral History
Project (University of the Witwatersrand), Ndwandwe his-
tory, box 1, evidence of John and Bongani Nxumalo, inter-
viewed by Dumisa Dlamini for Swaziland Broadcasting Ser-
vice, 3 June 1983, notebook 1, pp. 7-9; Ndwandwe history,
box 1, evidence of Bongani Nxumalo interviewed by the same,
10 June 1983, notebook 3, pp 42-58; Ndwandwe history, box
1, evidence of Mafutha Mazibuko interviewed by Philip Bon-
ner at Nhlunguyavuka, 11 June 1970, typescript, p. 1. My
thanks to Ronette Engela and Carolyn Hamilton for guiding
me towards these sources.
64. Delius, The Land Belongs to Us. pp. 19-24.
65. Wright, 'Dynamics of power', pp. 189-91.
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established was still tenuous, and their concerns on this
frontier were essentially defensive. To the north was a zone
of instability where the intrusive Msane, Ngoni and Gaza
rivalled one another, as well as the Portuguese, for domina-
tion. To the north-west the Ndwandwe were building a new
polity and re-establishing some of their former power.^6 In
this volatile situation, there was nothing to indicate which
of these groups, including the Zulu, would emerge as dominant.
The east: the consolidation of new states in the 1820s and
1830s
By the mid-1820s the political scene east of the highveld was
very different from what it had been in the 1810s. The two
major political units in the region were the emerging states
or kingdoms ruled by the Ndwandwe under Zwide in the eastern
Transvaal and by the Zulu under Shaka south of the Mkhuze
river. In the literature, the size and power of the Zulu
kingdom at this time has been heavily exaggerated and
mythologized. To a large extent this is because it survived
the upheavals of the 1820s to become the dominant power in the
region, and to take an important place in history books and in
oral traditions. But, as Russell Martin and Carolyn Hamilton
have argued in different ways, much of its reputation as fero-
cious military power was constructed by white and black
writers and story-tellers in later years, particularly in the
decades after its defeat by the British in the Anglo-Zulu war
of 1879.67 In rethinking the history of the early Zulu king-
dom, we need to be very much on guard against uncritically
accepting received opinion, academic and non-academic alike.
Research done by Carolyn Hamilton and me since the early
1980s, in which we build particularly on the earlier work of
David Hedges, points towards conclusions that in many respects
modify or overturn those in conventional accounts.68 In the
first half of the 1820s the main strategic aim of the Zulu
leaders was to safeguard their northern borders against
possible raids by groups from the turbulent regions beyond.
To this end, Shaka established a number of strong settlements
among the chiefdoms south of the Mkhuze river. Contrary to
the common view, the new Zulu state did not have the military
66. Wright, 'Dynamics of power', unpubl. thesis, pp. 187-93.
.67. R. Martin, 'British images of the Zulu, c.1820-1879', un-
publ. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1982; C.A.
Hamilton, 'Authoring Shka: models, metaphors and histori-
ography', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, Johns Hopkins University,
1993.
68. C.A. Hamilton, 'Ideology, oral traditions and the struggle
for power in the early Zulu kingdom', unpubl. M.A. thesis.
University of the Witwatersrand, 1986; Wright, 'Dynamics of
power', unpubl. thesis.
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or political means to extend its direct rule further north.69
Nor was it strong enough to pursue a policy of active expan-
sion to the south. In this direction, Shaka's main concern
was to establish domination over the chiefdoms on both banks
of the Thukela river and in the coastlands to the south.
Though Zulu forces made several raids into the teritories
south of the river, they did not, as is commony believed,
'devastate' the region. The political upheavals which it
suffered in the 1820s were caused primarily by the depreda-
tions of groups migrating away from the zone of conflict north
of the Thukela.70
Though the Zulu leaders sought to establish a system of strong
central government, their kingdom remained only loosely
united. Like other African kingdoms, it was an amalgamation
of separate chiefdoms under a common overlord. Throughout
Shaka's reign, the Zulu faced strong opposition from some of
the chiefdoms subject to them. In addition, Shaka had to deal
with the hostility of rival factions within the Zulu ruling
house.71 In the last years of his reign, he turned more and
more for support to the small parties of British traders
which, from 1824, he had allowed to operate from Port Natal.
He looked to them to supply him with prestige goods from the
outside world, to open up commercial and diplomatic relations
with the Cape, and to assist him against his enemies inside
and outside the kingdom.72
In contrast to the case of the successful Zulu polity, we know
very little of the history of the Ndwandwe. The defeat and
final break-up of their kingdom in 1826 (see below) meant that
most of its history became lost to sight, and in most accounts
of the 1820s the Ndwandwe remain little more than a shadowy
presence in the eastern Transvaal. But the surviving scraps
of evidence suggest that by the early 1820s their chiefdom was
emerging as the dominant power in the region. Delius argues
that it was strong enough to defeat the established Pedi
polity,73 and evidence adduced by Bonner indicates that the
Ndwandwe attacked the expanding Dlamini chiefdom in what is
now Swaziland on several occasions. While some of these
69. Wright, 'Dynamics of power', unpubl. thesis, pp. 188-93.
70. Ibid., chs. 5, 6; Wright, 'Political transformations', in
Hamilton, ed., Mfecane Aftermath, in press.
71. On internal opposition to Shaka's rule, see Hamilton,
'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 184-6, 362-3; Wright,
'Dynamics of power', unpubl. thesis, pp. 253, 281-3, 353-5,
367-9.
72. Wright, 'Dynamics of power', unpubl. thesis, ch. 7; C.
Hamilton, '"The character and objects of Chaka": a
reconsideration of the making of Shaka as "mfecane" motor',
Jnl. Afr. Hist.. vol. 33 (1992), pp. 41-57.
73. Delius, The Land Belongs to Us. pp. 19-24.
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attacks were made when the Ndwandwe were still living in the
vicinity of the Phongolo river, others may have taken place
after they had moved to the eastern Transvaal.74 Also in this
later phase, they may have attacked the Khumalo or Ndebele
under Mzilikazi in the upper Vaal region.75 If so, pressure
from Ndwandwe expansion may have been a factor in Mzilikazi's
decision to shift further westward into the southern Transvaal
(see above). Another factor, as Cobbing suggests, may have
been the growth of slaving in the Delagoa Bay hinterland.76
By 1826 the expanding Ndwandwe kingdom seems to have been
pressing hard on the north-western borders of the Zulu king-
dom. If the evidence of the British trader Nathaniel Isaacs
is anything to go by, Shaka viewed the growth of Ndwandwe
power with considerable alarm.77 With the help of a small
party of gunmen from the British trading posts at Port Natal,
the Zulu king launched an attack on the Ndwandwe, defeated
them, and captured large numbers of cattle. This episode is
usually seen in the literature through the eyes of Henry Fynn,
a British trader who participated in the attack and has left a
brief account of it. He portrays the Zulu attack as a
response to an invasion on the part of the Ndwandwe: my own
reading of the evidence suggests that Shaka took advantage of
the presence of the British with their firearms to make an
attempt to destroy his main rival power.78 In the event, his
initiative succeeded. After its defeat, the Ndwandwe kingdom
fell apart. Some groups submitted to Shaka, while others went
off to give their allegiance to the leaders of other emerging
states in the region.
The break-up of the Ndwandwe left the Zulu kingdom as the
strongest state east of the Drakensberg. Two years later, in
1828, Shaka was assassinated in a 'palace coup' led by his
brother Dingane, who replaced him as ruler. The motives
behind this event, and its wider significance, have recently
been the subject of several new and differing interpreta-
tions.7^ The emergence of these differences points to the
74. Bonner, Kings. Commoners and Concessionaires, pp. 27-9;
and Bonner, pers. comm.
75. This is my interpretation of references to Ndwandwe-
Ndebele hostilities in T. Arbousset, Narrative of an Ex-
ploratory Tour to the North-East of the Colony of the Cape
of Good Hope. Cape Town, 1968 (1st publ. Cape Town, 1846),
pp. 185, 294.
76. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', p. 506.
77. N. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africaf Cape
Town, date (ist publ. London, 1836), p. 71.
78. See the analysis of this event in Wright, 'Dynamics of
power', unpubl. thesis, pp. 338-44.
79. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp. 513-19; Wright,
'Dynamics of power', unpubl. thesis, pp. 367-71; Hamilton,
'"Character and objects of Chaka1", JAH, vol. 33 (1992),
pp. 57.
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pressing need for fresh research, drawing on the relatively
plentiful evidence in the James Stuart Archive and in Cape
archival documents and newspapers, into the relationship
between the internal politics and foreign policies of the Zulu
kingdom in the latter part of Shaka's reign and the early
years of Dingane's. On this latter period, all that can be
said here is that, like his predecessor, Dingane faced consid-
erable resistance from powerful chiefs inside the kingdom,
but, by eliminating a number of Shaka's closest supporters,
and by making frequent presents of cattle to important politi-
cal and military leaders, he was for a time able to keep oppo-
sition in check.80 Like Shaka, he was anxious to expand trad-
ing relations with the British at the Cape. He also en-
couraged the development of commerce with the Portuguese at
Delagoa Bay, and in 1833 went as far as making an attack on
them in order to keep open the trade route to the bay.81
Another effect of the collapse of the Ndwandwe kingdom in 1826
was to leave the way open for the expansion of the Dlamini or
Swazi chiefdom under Sobhuza, and the re-emergence of the Pedi
chiefdom under Sekwati. In the 1830s, Bonner tells us,
Sobhuza was extending his rule over much of Swaziland and
adjoining regions of the eastern Transvaal. By 1836 his
chiefdom was firmly enough established to survive an attack by
a large Zulu force sent against it by Dingane.82 To the
north-west, in the region of the Olifants river, Delius's
research shows, Sekwati was able to rebuild Pedi ascendancy
through a combination of clever diplomacy and successful raid-
ing of cattle from smaller groups. He was also able to
attract numbers of refugees from the upheavals caused in
neighbouring territories by the raids of the Swazi, the
Portuguese, and the 8^
The history of the eastern Transvaal-Swaziland-Zululand region
in the 1820s and 1830s will not be better understood until it
has been more comprehensively integrated with that of southern
Mozambique. To achieve this, anglophone researchers in the
region will need to take more account than they do at present
of the researches of their colleagues in Mozambique. One
important theme which needs to be researched and written from
a more integrated perspective is the expansion and impact of
the Delagoa Bay slave trade. Whatever the arguments about
when the trade originated, commentators seem to be agreed that
80. On the early years of Dingane's reign see Hedges, 'Trade
and polities', unpubl. thesis, pp. 242-4; Wright, 'Dynamics
of power', unpubl. thesis, pp. 372-5.
81. G. Liesegang, 'Dingane's attack on Lourenco Marques in
1833', Jnl. Afr. Hist.. vol. 10 (1969), pp. 565-79; Hedges,
'Trade and polities', unpubl. thesis, pp. 242-4.
82. Bonner, Kings. Commoners and Concessionaires, pp. 39-41.
83. Delius, The Land Belongs to Usf pp. 26-30.
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by the mid-1820s it was growing in importance.84 But because
its significance has only recently come to be appreciated by
historians, as yet very little is known either about its ex-
tent or about its effects on the societies of the region.
Another major theme has to do with the processes by which the
Gaza kingdom under Soshangane emerged by the late 1820s as the
dominant power in southern Mozambique. For scholars brought
up on now dubious ideas about the extent and power of the
'Zulu empire', it would be of particular interest to learn how
it came about that the sway exercised by Soshangane eventually
extended over much of Mozambique as far north as the Zambezi
river, a much larger region than that dominated by any other
chief in southern Africa.
Conclusion
Readers will have noticed that, in outlining a new approach to
explaining the processes of political change which took place
in the interior and eastern regions in the period from the
1760s to the 1830s, I nowhere need to make use of the concept
of the mfecane. This is not because I am looking for a new
name for it; it falls away because I adopt an analytical focus
which is quite different from that of mfecane-informed
history. The latter almost invariably assumes, on the basis
of minimal evidence, that the most significant political
changes of the era were concentrated into the 1820s and 1830s,
and that they were set in train primarily by the expansionism
of the Zulu kingdom. These notions are incompatible with the
argument which I put forward here.
As I see it, two separate and expanding zones of political
instability were emerging from about the 1760s onwards, one on
the south-east fringes of the Kalahari and the other in the
hinterland of Delagoa Bay. They were the product of the
meshing of European colonial and commercial expansion with
indigenous political conflicts. By the 1820s these zones were
beginning to overlap; the result was an intensification of
conflict, particularly in the interior regions, and the emer-
gence of a number of relatively large and centralized
polities. These states, as we may call them, were still con-
solidating themselves when, in the later 1830s, the migration
of parties of Boers and their retainers from the Cape into the
territories across the Orange and Vaal inaugurated a new era
of violence and instability in much of southern Africa.
84. Eldredge, in Hamilton, ed., Mfecane Aftermath, in press.
